SEC
December 14 Meeting Examines Alternative Models for Consolidation of Market Data
December
28 , 2000
The
initial meeting of the SEC Advisory Committee focused on the core issues of transparency
and consolidation and was driven by the announced intent of the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) to withdraw (pending regulatory approval) from the Consolidated
Tape Association. That discussion generated a significant amount of debate among
participants on the both the concept of transparency and on the mechanism of achieving
data consolidation (see FISD summary). As a result,
Dean Seligman asked participants to submit written proposals on alternative plans
for achieving consolidation -- to be used as the basis for the December 14 meeting.
Five
organizations (NYSE, Reuters,
Island, Schwab and Archipelago
pdf files) provided comment letters in response to Dean Seligman's request. FISD
encourages all members to carefully read the submission letters. They are all
very well done and reflect some significant and creative thinking about the future
of the National Market System. From our perspective, there seem to be two consistent
themes among all five alternative model proposals.
The
first is the promotion of efficiency through competition among multiple consolidators
for the collection, processing and dissemination of best quotation and last sale
data. Virtually everyone makes the point that competition would enable the industry
to achieve more efficiency and lower costs in data consolidation. Central to achieving
the efficiency objective is the recognition that continuing to adhere to mainframe
technology (embedded in the current system of monopoly data consolidators) --
rather than using network technologies to collect and disseminate market data
-- will hinder, rather than enhance the goals of the Securities Act amendments
of 1975. Competition among security information processors (SIPs) would promote
efficiency through the use of distributed architecture and industry-standard protocols,
minimize exposure to a single point of technology failure, and promote investment
in greater distribution capacity. NYSE summarized it succinctly by stating that
"technology has evolved to the point where CTA is no longer needed to consolidate
data."
The
second essential theme focused on the definition of transparency and the benefits
of information competition. According to the discussion, transparency is about
a "view of the world" and does not mean the same thing to everyone.
The concept of one-size fits all was uniformly described as "archaic."
The value of transparency is better measured against an investor's ability to
assimilate data, make investment decisions and execute trades.
Not
surprisingly, there was little support for the notion of the government continuing
to mandate the appropriate level of transparency. And while everyone supported
the continuation of non-discriminatory access to the national best bid/offer --
most believe that mandates are not necessary because the marketplace will demand
that participants reveal multiple levels of liquidity and information competition
will ensure the greatest degree of information flow to the marketplace. The essential
point was that information competition should be promoted and that consolidators
should have the freedom to offer a broad range of robust data services beyond
the NBBO.
In
fact, the discussion went a lot further. Most participants favor multiple, competing
quote products -- including the dissemination of non-consolidated, properly-identified
market data -- to the industry. Most agree that a distinction should be made between
the NBBO and richer quote formats reflecting depth at multiple price levels. The
emerging recommendation seems to be that the SEC should do what it can to promote
the creation of more value-added information -- and provide incentives to improve
dissemination and content -- through unrestricted information competition. In
such an environment, prices, terms and conditions would be left to the marketplace
(subject to the existing fair and reasonable statute) with compensation based
on the value of the data. In essence, competition will reduce the dissemination
of unnecessary information and will result in the best data, the best processing
and the best order routing.
FISD
did an analysis of the five alternative model proposals and produced this rough
comparison chart:
(Printable
version pdf file of Alternative Model Proposal Analysis)
Alternative
Model Proposal Analysis |
<Issue
Area | <NYSE | <Reuters | <Island
| <Schwab | <Archipelago |
Competition
among SIPs | -
Advocates multiple non-exclusive consolidators - Monopolies are no longer needed | -Wants
end to consolidators monopoly (no longer needed) - Need reforms that promote
competition from multiple consolidation entities | -Promotes
the creation of multiple, competing SIPs -Competing SIPs should have the option
of consolidating data from all or only certain exchanges | -Independent
consolidation (but prohibits exchanges from being consolidators, licensing data,
setting fees and allocating revenue based on basis of market share) | -
Current legacy model is inefficient and costly - Promotes exclusive SIP to
collect, process and disseminate best quotation and last sale |
Reform
NMS Governance | -
Too many levels of bureaucracy - No single vote veto - Revenue sharing
model does not match value of data (end inter-exchange subsidies) |
| | -
Existing governance structure impedes innovation and competition by creating conflicts
of interest on role of exchange - Remove exchange authority over admin. -
Eliminate veto vote - Need outside voice in governance - ECNs should be
direct plan participants | -
Cornerstone is competition coupled with sensible rulebook and high-speed market
linkages - Wants governing committee consisting of all participant SROs to
set market rules and pick IT provider - Eliminate conflicts of interest -
No veto power |
More
efficiency from leveraging technology | Technology
has evolved to the point where CTA is no longer needed to consolidate data | -
More efficiency is possible (computer processing, industry-standard protocols) -
Get away from 'mainframe' and toward 'network' - Competition is the best way
to promote technological efficiency | -
Government should not set standards for formats -- rather standards set by market
competition - More efficiency in data consolidation (distributed architecture,
greater distributed capacity, minimize exposure to single point of failure) | -
Competition among SIPs would promote efficiency in data dissemination (beyond
limited, pre-set formats) - No market incentives to upgrade capacity resulting
in slow dissemination, stale quotes and other capacity problems | -
Competitive bid to get best in terms of cost and functionality - Industry standard
protocols would simplify and make process more cost effective |
Information
Competition | | -Information
competition will ensure the greatest degree of information flow to the marketplace -
Consolidator should have freedom to offer a broad range of robust data services
beyond the regulated minimum - Information competition eliminates the need
for cost-based pricing review | -Allow
competing SIPs to offer information services on unregulated terms and conditions -
Allow choice of including an exchange quote in consolidated feed based on the
value of data rather than regulatory requirement - SIP must disclose what's
included - Prices, terms and conditions are left to marketplace subject to
fair and reasonable statute - Compensation is based on value of market data
(faster, more useful is better than auto-quotes) - Competition among exchanges
to reduce unnecessary and encourage production of more valuable data -More
robust/competitive market for data will reduce price | -
Information competition should be promoted (distinction made between NBBO and
richer quote formats reflecting depth at multiple price levels) - Wants multiple,
competing quote products including dissemination of unconsolidated market data
(multiple levels of price and depth of data) through 3rd party vendors | -
Allow dissemination of NBBO and additional data to non-exclusive competing information
collector - Competition means economic incentives to improve dissemination
and content Market data price determined by marketplace based on value of data
|
Government
Mandates (NBBO minimum) | -
Continuation of consolidated NBBO | -
Continuation of consolidated NBBO | -
Government should not set minimum standards for market data content -- rather
market competition would ensure timely/accurate data is made available - Market
data regulation is not required, competition and rules will ensure that investors
get the best data, depth of market, best order processing/order routing - Exchanges
continue to be required to provide last sale and quotation information to SIPs
- No change to fair, reasonable, not overly discriminatory statute - Recommends
allowing exchanges to send non-consolidated, properly identified market data within
their own market | -
Government should focus on fundamental principles governing the operation of the
NMS (get the principles right then don't have to worry about getting a single
model adopted) | -
Preserve the fundamental goal of consolidation and dissemination of market data |
Best
Execution Rule | -
No change | | -
No change -- protects investors | |
|
Non-Discriminatory
Access | -
No change | -
Standards to require non-discriminatory access to consolidated data | -
Maintains requirement for non-discriminatory access to consolidated data | -
Eliminate distinction between retail and professional markets |
|
Regulatory
Framework | -
No change | -
Substantive regulation of mechanisms for market data dissemination do more harm
than good | | -
Current structure requires a reluctant SEC to engage in rate making to counter
exchange interests in maximizing ROI in information - Promote competition and
minimize regulation wherever possible | -
Two options (1) governing committee designates a single regulator (2) each SRO
regulates compliance (self and counter-party) with SEC for conflict resolution |
Display
rules | -
No change | -
Modification/elimination of display rule would promote flexibility to manage systems
and information | -Exchange/SIP
should no longer have the right to approve how vendors disseminate modified exchange
data | |
|
Other |
| -
Continued broker-dealer obligation to submit transaction and quote data to a consolidator
but free to negotiate terms | -
Recommends the creation of new disclosure rule (replace NYSE trade through rule)
to ensure that data is accurate, transparent and not misleading to investor | -
Right size administration and fee structures (creates burdens, is inefficient,
restricts product packaging options, restricts data usage) |
|
There was so much "a priori" synergy among the Advisory Committee that
Schwab was motivated to pose the core question -- i.e. do we have a defender of
the current system? The general tone of the meeting was captured in the comment
letter by Archipelago. "Unfortunately, the current model for collecting and
disseminating market information reflects all the telltale signs of a legacy model,
untouched by competition and innovation, designed for a different place and time.
Costly, inefficient and unfair -- and operated under the purview of a poorly-conceived
governance structure -- it is rare to find a major constituency that genuinely
supports the status quo model. Change is in the air."
And
that, I believe will be the orientation of the March 1 meeting! It is not so much
a debate about whether a new model is needed. One is! But rather a debate about
what form of change can be facilitated to encourage vigorous competition without
overly shocking (or perhaps seriously jeopardizing) the U.S. securities industry.
This is where the skill of Dean Seligman will be brought to bear. The assignment
for March 1 is to examine ways to improve the existing system. The issues to be
considered are likely to be: the definition of minimal mandated levels of data;
improvements in the technological infrastructure capabilities of an exclusive
SIP; pricing inequities and alternatives to revenue-sharing by static formula;
essential changes to the existing governance structure (such as elimination of
the single vote veto); market data administration, and the basis of determining
fee levels for market data (including the SEC's role in fee regulation).
Left
to a future discussion are the (more) important issues of a new model for market
data dissemination, the introduction of competition among SIPs, marketplace approaches
to capacity management, the role and value of information competition; and the
essential debate over data ownership.
Stay
tuned.
Please
contact Mike Atkin at matkin@siia.net
with any questions or comments.